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I want to take as my texts today statements made to me in 
corres�ondence and conversation by two senior quantitative historians. 
Each statement illustrates what I believe to be misjudgments about 
the proper methodological priorities for quantitative historians in 
America today. To spare these historians from publicity which their 
casual statements were not intended to invite, but mostly to protect 
myself against reprisal, I shall not name them here. 
The first statement arose because I assigned a particular 
book in my American Political History course. Some of my colleagues, 
students; and I were critical of the methodology employed in the 
book, and a student suggested we might reanalyze the data, employing 
different techniques. The data set, however, was rather obscure 
and was apparently not available at any major archive. When I wrote 
to the author, rather brashly asking for a copy of his computer tapes, 
I·was informed that he had "lost interest" in the project after the 
first year or so and discarded most of the tapes and IBM cards. 
I was astonished. Here was a project based on data 
painstakingly collected for more than a decade from a wide variety of 
published and unpublished sources; coded, punched, and verified; and 
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and he had chucked it out almost immediately after performing a 
rather idiosyncratic analysis which had produced striking and 
controversial conclusions. However obscure the sources, the data 
could easily have been stored on one inexpen�ive computer tape. But 
since he had erased the tape, his analysis couldn1t be checked, much 
less improved upon, without investing years of drudgery reassembling 
the data. 
Before examining further this first case, let me sketch a 
second. While talking with another senior historian at a professional 
meeting, I was asked what I had been doing recently. I told him I 
had been dissatisfied with the rather murky understanding of statistics 
I had gotten in graduate school, and that I had therefore been 
retooling by taking mathematics, statistics, and econometrics courses. 
His response was to ask me what good it did to know calculus and 
matrix algebra. Again, innocent that I am, my response was astonish­
ment. I had thought that everyone gave at least lip service to the 
ideas that, first, math was a good thing; and, second, it was better 
to understand techniques deeply rather than superficially. Unprepared 
for his query, I therefore responded only lamely and vaguely, 
I want to use these two minor events as jumping-off points 
for making a few concrete, and, I hope, practical suggestions about 
the proper methodological agenda for historians in the next few years. 
I will contend that: (1) an excess of individualism has led to a 
squandering of opportunities for accumulating and improving both our 
knowledge of the past and the profession's overall level of 
methodological expertise; (2) fundi.ng agencies and consulting 
committees for those agencies could greatly assist the profession by 
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further encouraging the storage of data collected under grants from 
them and the initiation of projects based on reanalyses of already 
available data; (3) by applying now some lessons which may be 
gleaned from the experiences of our sister social science disciplines, 
we may avoid merely recapitulating what are now seen in those 
disciplines as unfortunate side-tracks and errors; (4) except for 
some projects in economic history, the techniques employed by self� 
proclaimed quantitative historians have been a good deal cruder than 
they could and ought to have been; (5) the use of more sophisticated 
techniques might well have led to different conclusions; and (6) 
the exploitation of these techniques will require a radical change 
in the way quantitative historians are trained and, probably, the 
development of methodology into a full-blown subdiscipline in the 
profession. 
Let me argue the first three points by reanalyzing the 
experience of the state and local politics subdivision of political 
science in .the 1960s. 
In 1960, state and local politics was a backwater which 
had resisted the behavioral flood of the 1950s. Members of this 
land-locked subdiscipline rejected the tendency of the behavioralists 
to generalize broadly, just as they hesitated to immerse themselves 
in the deep waters of sociological and psychological theory and the 
tide of statistics that characterized the new reign in the profession. 
In 1963, however, James A. Robinson and Richard E. Dawson plunged 
into the behavioral waters to rescue a bobbing remark which V. o. Key 
had cast forth some fourteen years earlier. Assembling from data in 
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the Book of the Stcites a set of variables with which they sought to 
operationalize and test Key's casually-formulated hypothesis, they 
launched a whole literature on "policy outputs" - a literature which 
is still sailing along. 
Undergirding this literature is a framework of factual and 
theoretical assumptions which were never very clearly blueprinted, 
and this failure to formulate clearly and examine closely the 
underlying design of the work made the whole project extremely 
unseaworthy from the beginning. Let me offer one possible formulation 
of the underlying axioms. As I see it, there were six crucial 
postulates which made up the empirical theory behind most of the 
state and local policy outputs literature; (1) sets of elites who 
care about little but winning compete in the political system by 
bidding for the votes of groups of non-elites; (2) the vast majority 
of non-elites rationally decide which package of political goods to 
purchase by choosing that bundle which maximizes their economic 
welfare, narrowly define_d; (3) the system operates so as to offer 
a premium to those who declare their choices last; (4) members 
of the lower socio-economic classes are less likely to vote than 
those in higher status groups; (5) virtually all governmental 
expenditures are redistributive: the higher the government budget 
level, the better off the lower classes are, compared to the.upper 
groups; and (6) nearly everyone has sufficient information about 
the effect of government spending to make their voting calculations. 
Although parts of these assumptions were themselves testable, 
most of the literature concentrated on hypotheses derived from them: 
increasing party competition. should have drawn more lower class voters 
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into the political system. Greater turnout would therefore reflect 
greater participation by the relatively poor. Since the lower 
strata would be the last to decide, the price of their votes would 
be maximal. Since governmental expenditures were redistributive, 
the lower classes would demand higher budgets in payment for their 
franchises. Therefore, higher degrees of party competition and 
turnout should be associated with higher levels of government 
expenditures. The null hypothesis could be formulated in two ways: 
either governmental expenditures of all kinds had roughly the same 
weight in· everyone's utility function, or they had the same weight 
in the ut1.lity functions of the elites in every geographical area 
and those elites, especially bureaucrats, paid little attention to 
what mere voters wanted. 
The data set on which these competing theories were tested 
consisted essentially of appropriately normalized indices of govern­
mental expenditures, income, party competition, turnout, education, 
etc., for each state in the post-World War II United States. At 
first the analyses were methodologically quite simple: states were 
simply classified into subgroups on various indices and those 
groupings were set side by side to see how they fit. This technique 
shortly gave way to rank-order and Pearsonian correlation coefficients, 
to mult1.ple and partial correlation, to multiple linear regression, 
stagewise regression, factor analysis, and nonlinear regression. 
The essential data set was quickly passed around to virtually all 
major universities and was constantly extended by adding more 
variables and.extending the time series. A great many graduate 
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students and young·professors appear to have cut their statistical 
teeth on this field;. and for awhile it became de _rigeur for each 
issue of a political science journal to contain an article on policy 
outputs which either introduced a previously untried statistical 
technique, extended the data set, refined an index, or critiqued a 
previous article. 
I would like to make two points about the policy outputs 
literature. First, the reanalyses did train a good many students 
and increase the general level of methodological competence among 
political scientists. This rise in competence made more sophisticated 
tests of theories possible. It did not, however, add as much as it 
could have to the profession's understanding of the policy process, 
because most of the contributors to the literature were content merely 
to crunch data. Since they did not think very seriously or deeply 
about their theoretical assumptions, they did not get very far in 
their theoretical conclusions. They did not, for example, explicitly 
mesh their research with the emerging formal theories of electoral 
competition and turnout derived from the work of Anthony Downs. 
The second point, then, is that the full benefits of reanalyses 
or initial analyses, for that matter -- will be achieved only when 
theory and methodology proceed hand in hand. 
To summarize so far: the lesson I draw from the policy 
outputs literature is that reanalyses of widely available data sets 
offer major opportunities for the advancement of a profession, but 
the benefits will be directly proportional to the theoretical self­
consciousness of the effort as a whole. 
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Let me turn now from reanalyzing reanalyses to considering 
past efforts in quantitative history and proposing changes in the 
way methodology is taught in history and the weight which should be 
attached to technical competence. 
In a recent article in Reviews in American History, I 
examined the methods employed in three leading works in quantitative 
history, especially efforts by members of the so-called "ethnocultural 
school.11 Let me repeat myself on only a couple of points. I found 
that, at a time when canned multi.ple regressio
n programs were 
widely available, when both exposes of the so-called "ecological 
correlation fallacy" and methods for dealing with it were pretty 
widely known, Professors Formisano, Hackney, and Kleppner relied in 
their monographs chiefly on so-called "eyeball correlation, " and 
(when they did employ statistical techniques) on rank-order 
coefficients and bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients. Perhaps 
more important, they generally assumed that the relationships of 
interest were all nicely linear, correctly specified and, in effect, 
that limitations on the range of their independent and dependent 
variables affected neither the bias nor the efficiency of their 
parameter estimates. Not only was the methodology employed much less 
sophisticated than it could easily have been, in other words, but 
better techniques almost certainly would have led to different or 
at least much weaker conclusions. 
Let me explain the point about truncated or limited 
dependent variables more fully and use it to illustrate my argument 
that it is necessary to include a much larger component of mathematics 
in training quantitative historians. 
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In their �nalyses of the effects of the ethnic and religious 
composition of the population on voting behavior, ethnoculturalist 
historians often focused on "banner units" -- e.g., the most Democratic 
or most Whig precincts or townships in an area. By concentrating on 
these units, they were considering only a limited range of their 
dependent variables. It is easy to show that this leads to a bias 
in the parameter estimates when one uses ordinary least squares or 
some simpler method which can be treated as an example of OLS. Thus, 
because they employed a faulty methodology, the conclusions of leading 
past quantitative historians are at best uncertain and at worst 
incorrect. 
Now, there has been a good deal of work on the problem of 
limited dependent variables in biometrics and, recently, in econometrics. 
The proposed cures for the disease of limited observations on the 
dependent variable involve probit, logit, Tobit, and other forms of 
--it analysis. The trouble is that such techniques often require 
the use of iterative algorithms to solve analytically insoluble 
integrals in equations which maximize various likelihood functions. 
Such forms of analysis which, by the way
,
' have considerably wider 
potential applications in political and social history than I have 
time to outline here -- will be pretty incomprehensible to historians 
who lack a solid grounding in calculus and statistics. Yet since 
simple techniques, mechanically applied, will often in practice lead 
to misleading or incorrect results, a much deeper knowledge of 
mathematics and statistics becomes a prerequisite both for doing 
good quantitative history and for evaluating the findings of 
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quantitative studies. Even historians who do little quantitative 
work themselves, in other words, need a much firmer grounding in 
methodology to be able to understand and appraise the works of other 
social, political, and especially economic historians. How can 
historians continue to stomach reviews of quantitative works which 
begin with the disclaimer: "I don 1 t know anything about numbers, 
but I know what I don't like!"? 
Recent experience from other social science disciplines 
gives even greater emphasis to the professional disutility of a mere 
formulaic and superficial statistical learning. Psychology and 
sociology departments, which have long required simple statistics 
courses of their graduate students, seem increasingly to be 
requiring calculus as an entry prerequisite and using it in their 
statistical sequence. Political .scientists, moreover," are growingly 
critical of the sixties' tendency to toss lots of data into a 
computer, add a dash of canned program, and serve up the resulting 
indigestible concoction to the public. The "workshop" articles in 
the American Journal of Political Science and the increasing 
tendency to substitute Johnston's Econometric Methods for Key's 
Primer of Statistics, Blalock's Social Statistics, or similar works 
evidence the fact that, in political science at least, a cookbook 
knowledge of statistics won't get you into heaven or even into a job 
anymore. 
To profit from the past experience of other disciplines, 
historians should move as quickly as possible through the cookbook 
phase to the stage in which self-conscious theorizing guides 
sophisticated methodological tools whose use is well understood. 
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Learning from the example of economic history, which has almost 
everywhere except at the University of Wisconsin been amputated 
from history departments and grafted onto economics, we should also 
attempt to avoid the further dismemberment of history as a discipline. 
Quantitative economic history is', as the brouhaha over Time on the 
Cross demonstrates, too important to the historical profession to 
be left to a small group of cliometricians. And though there have 
as yet been no bombshells in quantitative political or social history 
which have left as large craters as Time on the Cross has, the same 
argument holds for those subdisciplines as well. In sum, unless 
history departments begin to make a sophisticated training in 
statistical methodology and the relevant economic, political, or 
social theory a central part of their graduate training, they will 
be perpetuating easily overcome errors and producing students who 
will be increasingly unable to comprehend major developments in 
their fields. 
Such a program for the future of the historical guild wi11, 
of course, require a more mathematical apprenticeship and a larger 
number of well-trained masters than we have in the profession now. 
How are we to get from here to there? I have several specific 
proposals: 
1. History graduate programs should encourage applications 
from undergraduates with mathematical training, (There do exist 
some math and even engineering undergraduates who aren't totally 
illiterate. ) 
2. Temporarily, until they can offer the relevant.training 
themselves, history departments should relax requirements in graduate 
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programs to encourage students to tool up in mathematics and to take 
theory and methods courses in economics, political science, sociology, 
psychology, or statistics departments. Social and political 
historians ought especially to be urged, as their colleagues in 
economic history are now, to get a firm grounding in microeconomic 
theory and·some of its applications. Microtheory should serve not 
only as a source of hypotheses, but more importantly as a paradigm 
of how explicit theorizing and model-building might proceed, Students 
who wish to be intensively trained in new areas should neither be 
forced to take course overloads nor to pick up everything piecemeal 
and on their own, The requirement that all graduate students take 
minors in fields far outside their areas of primary interest must 
obviously fall. It may be cute for an American social historian to 
be able to discuss T'ang Poetry or name all the popes from the 
eighth through the fourteenth centuries, but these "broadening" facts 
are certainly less essential to his work than knowing what a partial 
derivative or a biased estimator is. 
3. Senior historians should encourage foundations, govern­
ment agencies, and major grantees to set up postdoctoral programs to 
allow historians to deepen their knowledge of methods and theory, 
or broaden existing programs to include historians. 
4. Presently-working historians need to realize that
summers at the Newberry or Ann Arbor, however useful in 
curing their irrational phobias about numbers and computers and 
introducing a few techniques, can no more transmogrify statistical 
illiterates into expert data analysts than a Berlitz course of the 
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same length can metamorphose an American into a Russian historian. 
Those who expect to be able to do more than read a simple menu in 
the language of statistics must consume calculus and linear algebra 
as appetizers and polish off a healthy main course of statistics 
and econometrics so that they can choose a dessert from a list of 
special applied topics such as probit and logit, scaling, or 
simultaneous equations. ·Short cuts or snacks will only result in 
indigestion or methodological ariemia. 
5. History departments, journal editors, and referees must 
comprehend both the difficulty of methodological retraining and the 
importance to the discipline of methodological innovation. Since it 
will take at least three years of intensive work (while carrying a 
teaching load) to achieve a passable level of methodological 
competence, methodologists-in-training may produce relatively few 
publications. Th,e promise of innovation should therefore be weighed 
more heavily in their promotion decisions than it often is today, 
Substantive articles which employ methodologies new to the profession, 
as well as nonsubstantive articles expositing such techniques, ought 
to grace the pages not only of the indisciplinary but also of the 
main-line journals -- yea, even approach the sacred tablets of the 
American Historical Review. The NEH, the NSF, and the referees and 
committees for those agencies ought to give special preference to 
methodologically innovative projects and require that any new 
machine-readable data produced in those projects be deposited in 
compatible and comprehensible formats at some central depository 
such as the one in Ann Arbor. 
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6. In the medium run, say, ten years, cliometricians 
{meaning here a breed of historians well schooled in relevant 
statistical techniques) ought to compose a small but well recognized 
subdiscipline in history similar to econometrics and the new polimetrics, 
Why a new subdiscipline? Why can't historians with quanti­
tative da�a sets just go visit their friendly local statisticians or 
econometricians when they have questions about methodology? Besides 
my gener�l belief that artisans should fully appreciate the tools 
they employ, there is also the fact that the problems historians 
will face will differ somewhat from those faced by other disciplines. 
Econometrics does not pay much attention to contingency tables or 
Markov processes; quantitative historians do or will. Polimetrics 
puts much more emphasis on analyzing surveys, psychometrics on 
analyzing batteries of tests, sociometrics on analyzing intragroup 
microrelations than most historians probably will. Moreover, 
certain topics which are of marginal interest in other fields, such 
as geographical aggregation problems, will be central in cliometrics, 
The training of students will be more efficient and advances on 
topics of special interest to historians will be more probable, 
therefore, if we begin to build up a specialized subdiscipline of 
our own. A first step toward the recognition and organization of this 
subdiscipline should certainly be the setting up of an SSHA network 
concerned with methodology. 
7. In the long term, say, a generation, every social, 
economic, and political historian should be expected to have a firm 
grasp of statistics as a matter of course. For that development 
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to yield really interesting, solid results, for history to become a 
science -- that is, a discipline firmly grounded in theory, in which 
results are falsifiable and cumulative -- we must grant first priority 
on the historical profession's agenda to serious, sophisticated 
training in both theory and methods. 
